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Background
There is a growing concern with the poten-
tial for terrorist use of biological weapons
(bioweapons) to cause civilian harm (1–5)
This concern has been focused around two
assumptions: that a terrorist is most likely
to effectively disperse bioweapons through
air (3), and that we must be prepared to
address terrorist use of bioweapons through
treatment of affected individuals, with
emphasis on strengthening the response of
the health-care community (3,5,6). For the
most part, concern has not focused on the
use of bioweapons in drinking water sys-
tems (4,7), and much less attention has
been paid to preattack detection than to
postattack treatment.
Threats to drinking water supplies have
plagued humans since the dawn of history.
These threats range from the spectacular and
highly disruptive (e.g., ﬂoods, spills of oil or
toxic chemicals) to the more mundane, but
not necessarily less important, such as impacts
from storm pipe discharges or runoff from
agricultural lands. A recent conference, “Early
Warning Monitoring to Detect Hazardous
Events in Water Supplies,” held 17–19 May
1999 in Reston, Viriginia (8), concluded that
terrorist use of bioweapons poses a signiﬁcant
threat to drinking water. Several pathogens
(e.g., anthrax, Clostridium perfringens, plague)
and biotoxins (e.g., botulinum, aflatoxin,
ricin) have been weaponized, are potentially
resistant to disinfection by chlorination, and
are stable for relatively long periods in water
(7). Further, although water provides some
dilution potential, any size neutrally buoyant
particle, as well as sophisticated technologies
such as microcapsules, can be used to disperse
human pathogens in drinking water systems.
Effectiveness of an attack can be enhanced
through introduction of the bioweapon near
the tap, such as in the distribution system
(postdisinfection). Water storage and distrib-
ution systems also facilitate delivery of an
effective dose of toxicant to a potentially very
large population, as well as a lower-level
chronic dose (for chemicals) with longer-term
effects and lower-detection thresholds. 
Although the probability of a terrorist
threat to drinking water is extremely low, the
consequences could be very severe for
exposed populations; thus, this conference
concluded that national attention must be
focused on detecting threats from biological
terrorism, as well as other catastrophic events
in drinking water supplies, and on preventing
human exposure wherever possible. To that
end, the conference concluded that technolo-
gy-based and other pre-event or pre-exposure
management strategies can be effective deter-
rents to widespread human exposure to
bioweapons, as well as other low-probabili-
ty/high-impact contaminant events in drink-
ing water supplies, such as the introduction
of Cryptosporidium (9). Of particular note are
new and developing technologies to rapidly
detect pathogens in real time, both in source
water and water distribution systems.
Included among these technologies are DNA
microchip arrays (10), immunologic tech-
niques (11), microrobots (12), and a variety
of optical technologies, ﬂow cytometry, mol-
ecular probes, and other techniques (13,14).
None of these technologies is presently avail-
able commercially nor have any of the tech-
nologies been tested in large drinking water
systems. However, this conference concluded
that these technologies may be among the
most effective approaches for early detection
and warning of the use of bioweapons, as
well as other catastrophic contamination
events in drinking water systems, and
encouraged their rapid development.
Given that early detection technologies
will likely be available in a few years, and that
pre-exposure management, where it is suc-
cessful, will prevent adverse health effects, it
is prudent to address the myriad issues that
are associated with the use of early detection
and warning systems, as well as other pre-
exposure management techniques. In this
paper, we present characteristics of early
warning systems (EWSs) and other pre-expo-
sure management approaches that may
increase the chances of preventing human
exposure, if biological weapons are used in
drinking water systems. We also address the
interpretation of, response to, and communi-
cation of information derived from EWSs.
This report reflects the deliberations of a
breakout group from this conference that
addressed system characteristics and interpre-
tation, response, and communication issues.
Early Warning Systems:
Desirable Properties and
Cost–Beneﬁt Considerations
The goal of an early warning monitoring sys-
tem is to reliably identify low-probability/
high-impact contamination events (chemical
and radiation as well as microbial) in source
water or distribution systems in time to
allow an effective local response to prevent
exposure. Although surveillance of infectious
disease or other public health effects is an
important component of impact assessment
in contamination events, surveillance does
not provide early warning, as it detects dis-
ease or other impacts after they have
occurred, often with a long lag time. Rather,
an EWS must detect a contamination event
in a time frame that allows the implementa-
tion of an effective response to reduce or
avoid entirely the adverse impacts that may
result from the event.
The development and implementation of
EWSs are likely to be costly and labor inten-
sive; thus, several factors must converge to
support their use. Generally, local support for
EWSs will occur when the cost and frequen-
cy of false positives is less than the beneﬁts of
averting true positives. When, on the other
hand, the cost of monitoring exceeds any
beneﬁt from the use of an EWS, it is unlikely
that there will be support for the system. 
The extent of the difference between
beneﬁts and costs that is required to support
an EWS will be determined at the local level
and will likely differ among localities. Local
support will generally increase as the risk or
perception of risk of serious illness increases.
Risk or the perception of risk will also
increase as the presence or effectiveness of
existing barriers (e.g., chlorination for
pathogens) decreases, as the seriousness (per-
ceived or real) of the potential illness increas-
es, and as the size of the affected population
increases (among others). 
Regardless of the cost–beneﬁt ratio, the
EWS must be reliable; that is, it must be sen-
sitive, speciﬁc, reproducible, and veriﬁable [as
well as supported by appropriate quality
assurance/quality control (QA/QC) proce-
dures]. It should minimize the potential for
both high numbers of false negative and false
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EWS and their attendant costs will increase
as the ancillary benefits of the system
increase. Systems that can detect and warn of
many contaminants, or that provide broad
coverage of many parameters, will be more
desirable than systems that provide narrow
coverage or detect relatively few parameters.
However, it is likely that EWSs that provide
broad coverage will be more expensive to
operate and maintain than EWSs that provide
narrow coverage; therefore, the cost–beneﬁt
ratio for each system and decisions regarding
desirability must be assessed at the local level.
Finally, systems that are easy to install and
operate, that provide continuous monitoring,
that use standardized analytical equipment,
and that enhance source identification are
likely to increase desirability. Continuous
monitoring reduces the likelihood that conta-
mination events will be missed (although it
also increases the costs of equipment mainte-
nance, data interpretation, etc.), whereas stan-
dardized equipment can be more easily shared
among users and repaired and replaced than
custom equipment.
Interpreting the Output 
of EWS 
The most effective use of an EWS will occur
where there is a structured, well-defined
approach to the interpretation of data gener-
ated by the EWS and to the types of respons-
es that are triggered by data from the EWS.
Interpretation of data from an EWS may be
particularly problematic. Determining when
a response is necessary, based on the perfor-
mance of an EWS, requires a clearly estab-
lished baseline for contaminants or events of
interest, and a clearly established deviation
from the baseline. Both the baseline and
deviation from it that triggers a response
must be determined in advance of any conta-
mination event, rather than in response to a
particular event. Ideally, both the baseline
and deviation from it will be established at
the time of EWS installation.
Baseline development will be contami-
nant or event speciﬁc and will likely be inﬂu-
enced by the toxicity of a compound or
pathogen, the nature and extent of population
or subpopulation exposure to the compound
as well as to similarly acting compounds or
pathogens, by the ability to detect the com-
pound or pathogen (test sensitivity and speci-
ficity), and at least to some extent by the
perceived risks associated with exposure to the
compound or pathogen. In some cases, a
maximum contaminant level (MCL) estab-
lished by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency may be used as the baseline.
However, MCLs do not exist for most
microbiological contaminants. In this case, a
baseline level must be developed. This can be
done at the community level and should
include a variety of stakeholders including
but not limited to scientists, public health
experts, emergency management officials,
local politicians, and representatives from the
community at large.
Establishment of a trigger (deviation
from a baseline that results in a particular
response such as a “boil water” advisory) will
be inﬂuenced by the nature and magnitude
of the adverse event (e.g., by the extent of
public health impact that could occur as a
result of the contamination event), by the
nature of the action to be taken as a result of
trigger exceedance, and at least to some
extent by the perceived risk of exposure to
the compound or pathogen. A stringent trig-
ger (little difference between the baseline
and deviation from the baseline that triggers
an action or response) may be appropriate
for events that have severe public health con-
sequences. A less stringent trigger may be
appropriate for actions that have signiﬁcant
costs (monetary or others) such as shutting
down an entire water supply system to a
large metropolitan area. However, a strin-
gent trigger may be appropriate even where
an action has signiﬁcant costs, when a conta-
mination event has a very severe public
health impact, or where the perception of
risk is very high. Finally, trigger develop-
ment must be inﬂuenced by the sensitivity
and specificity of the test; that is, triggers
must be developed to minimize both false
positives and false negatives associated with
the analytical methodology. 
A confirmation step, which does not
necessarily preclude action, should also be
included in the interpretation process for
EWSs. Where a trigger is exceeded, steps
should be taken to conﬁrm the exceedance.
Confirmation may include resampling or
intensiﬁed sampling and analysis, duplicate
analyses, and other QA/QC procedures.
Depending on the nature of the contamina-
tion event and on the potential public health
impacts, an action may or may not be taken
until a conﬁrmation process has been imple-
mented and appropriate results provided.
Clearly, where there are severe public health
consequences, action should not await con-
ﬁrmation. However, subsequent actions, or
delays in implementing them, may be inﬂu-
enced by the outcome of conﬁrmatory steps.
Where there is a high number of false posi-
tives (determined as a result of the conﬁrma-
tion step), subsequent actions based on
trigger exceedance may be delayed.
Additionally, a high number of false posi-
tives should trigger an assessment of the
analytical equipment and methods, to deter-
mine the causes of the high false-positive rate
and to identify improvements in the equip-
ment and methods to reduce false positives.
Response and
Communication
Many responses are possible when an alarm is
triggered by an early warning monitoring sys-
tem. Responses may include modiﬁcation to
the drinking water system (shutdown, addi-
tion of disinfectants, etc.), notice (boil water
advisory) either to the general public or to
target communities or subpopulations, addi-
tional data gathering or monitoring, follow-
on surveillance and epidemiologic studies, no
action, and some combination of these,
among others. The type of response will be
dependent on the nature of the threat and
the nature of the drinking water system,
including the population served by it. For
example, a response to a threat received by
phone may differ from a response detected
by an EWS. For a phone threat, a determina-
tion of credibility may be necessary prior to
performing a response. Where an EWS is in
place, credibility of the threat may be judged
by the performance of the EWS itself, when
it is capable of detecting the contaminants
included in the threat. Where an EWS is not
in place, additional steps may be necessary to
judge credibility and to determine the appro-
priate response. Steps may include monitor-
ing for the contaminant at appropriate loca-
tions in the source water or distribution sys-
tem, and monitoring for surrogate parame-
ters that may indicate contamination (e.g.,
increased chlorine demand, changes in pH).
Additionally, law enforcement representatives
and psychologists may provide insight into
the credibility of the threat. 
Regardless of their nature, a critical com-
ponent to the success of any EWS is the
preparation of a process or plan that provides
guidelines for the type and extent of response
to all potential threats. The plan must be
developed in advance of the threat and prefer-
ably concurrent with the development of the
EWS. In effect, the plan should be considered
part of a comprehensive emergency planning
process for a variety of threats to public
health, both waterborne and non-waterborne. 
The emergency response plan must be
developed with the participation of all major
stakeholders. Some stakeholders include
• Individuals with specific expertise (e.g.,
microbiologists, toxicologists)
• Politicians/community leaders
• Health department, hospital representa-
tives, other health care professionals
• Representatives of the local water utility
• Representatives of water regulatory agen-
cies (local, state, and federal)
• Representatives of high-risk groups
• Staff from the wastewater treatment plant
• Major water users and processors
• Law enforcement agencies
• Psychologists
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(e.g., ﬁre department)
• Representatives of sources that pose poten-
tial threats to the drinking water system
There is extensive experience with the
development of emergency response plans
that can be drawn upon by communities
interested in implementing an early warning
monitoring system. The U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
National Infrastructure Protection Center of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Emergency Management and Emergency
Preparedness Ofﬁce of the U.S. Health and
Human Services offer guidelines for emer-
gency response plan development.
Approaches to postevent response have also
been developed (3,5,6).
The nature and extent of communica-
tion of the threat to the affected population
should also be guided by the emergency
response plan. A chain of communication
should be established as part of the plan,
from the point where information of the
threat is received to the final implementa-
tion and communication of the response to
the threat. Experts from the local utility
and representatives from the health care
community, hospitals, law enforcement
agencies, and other emergency preparedness
groups should be included in the chain of
communication. 
A particularly delicate matter is the
communication of the existence of the EWS
prior to any threat that it detects. It is con-
ceivable that awareness of the EWS and its
goal may stimulate a few individuals to per-
form acts that threaten the drinking water
system or its users. Therefore, the existence
of the EWS must be put into the context of
preparations for a variety of events including
floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, etc. It
should not be advertised simply as a tech-
nology designed to address terrorism or
other intentional or unintentional threats.
The EWS must be framed in a positive
manner by emphasizing the importance of
real-time monitoring for a variety of chemi-
cals and pathogens, designed to better
understand all potential threats to the sys-
tem and consumers. Additional steps to
raise positive awareness of the EWS include
general community education about where
drinking water comes from, how it is han-
dled at the treatment plant, and how it is
dispersed in the community (without pro-
viding enough information to highlight a
system’s vulnerability). Tests of prepared-
ness for and response to water emergencies
(akin to testing the tornado sirens) should
also be conducted and publicized in the
community. Again, these tests should be
cast in a positive light, with emphasis on
general preparedness rather than on prepa-
rations for speciﬁc events. 
Conclusions
An EWS must reliably identify low-proba-
bility/high-impact contamination events in
source water or distribution systems in time
to allow an effective local response. The type
and nature of the response, and the method
of communication of the response will be
dependent upon the type and nature of the
threat, on the characteristics of the EWS
itself, and on the nature of the affected
population. Critical to the successful devel-
opment, implementation, and use of an
EWS is strong community support for the
system. This support must be derived from
aggressive education activities regarding
community drinking water supplies, and
from active participation of community
members and stakeholders in the develop-
ment and implementation of the EWS.
Especially critical is the development of an
emergency preparedness plan that guides the
type of responses associated with a signal
from the EWS and the communication of
actions based on the responses. 
The resources necessary for the develop-
ment, installation, operation, and maintenance
of an EWS will be substantial; therefore,
virtually all of the decisions regarding the
EWS must be made at the local or communi-
ty level. This includes the type of EWS to
install (and its attendant costs), interpretation
of information from the EWS, responses that
should occur as a result of a signal from the
EWS, and the nature of communications to
the affected public. The emergency prepared-
ness plan will play a crucial role in many of
these decisions, and there should be signiﬁ-
cant local involvement in the development of
the plan. However, funding assistance for
EWS development, installation, and opera-
tion may be available from both the state and
the federal government. Extensive guidance is
also available from a variety of federal agen-
cies on the development of emergency
response plans.
An EWS should not preclude actions to
ensure or strengthen the security of drinking
water systems in every community. Points of
vulnerability in both source water and distri-
bution systems should be identiﬁed in each
community, and steps taken to reduce the
vulnerability at these points. Steps may be as
simple as securing hydrants or other entry
points to the distribution system, or
installing improved security around treat-
ment and storage facilities. These and many
other simple steps may signiﬁcantly reduce
system vulnerability as EWSs are developed
and as their costs decrease, so that they may
be available to all communities, regardless of
size and resources.
There are also sociological issues that
must be addressed as technological and non-
technological approaches are implemented.
This conference concluded that a threat
(whether real or a hoax) to a drinking water
system may pose as much problem as a ter-
rorist act, and response plans should consid-
er how to address potentially unrealized
threats. Further, individuals involved in
efforts to protect drinking water must be
cognizant of the ramiﬁcations of the effort
itself; even discussion of potential terrorism
in drinking water systems, such as through
this paper, must be done carefully so as not
to provide a stimulus for the act. 
To ensure the full protection of drink-
ing water, or other media, a technology-
based early warning monitoring system
should be just one component of a com-
prehensive program to protect the public
from biological terrorism and other low-
probability/high-impact contamination
events, whether they occur in air, water, or
food. The program must also include phys-
ical, social, and economic steps to prevent
the problem, as well as follow-up monitor-
ing to ensure that early detection of disease
will occur if a monitoring system or other
steps fail.
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